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Abstract – A reified opposition between social cooperation (stakeholderism) and Neoliberal 
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stood. Pressure to become more flexible in many areas of work and organizational life has not 
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continual and collaborative recomposition of stakeholder roles in and among firms and social 
actors. In other words, stakeholder governance is not disintegrating or giving way to the mar-
ket in Germany. It is being redefined. Experimentation with roles and rules by creative actors 
drives the alternative analysis. The argument is developed empirically by a discussion of current 
local trends in the system of industrial relations 
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By the middle of the first decade of the 21st century, there was widespread agree-
ment across the German political spectrum on the need for reform in the central insti-
tutions of the “German Model” of political economy: i.e., in the systems of industrial 
relations, vocational training, corporate governance, and finance. Remarkably, despite 
such broad agreement on the need for change, no workable coalitions or reform pro-
grams have emerged that a majority of German citizens find acceptable. Indeed, as a 
grand coalition fragmented and parties split into ever hardening positions, perhaps the 
only consensus about reform that broad groupings of Germans across the political 
spectrum shared was that they did not want to push their society in the direction of 
the United States. By this they meant that they did not want crucial questions in their 
society – how the labor market should work, how relations between employers and 
employees should be governed, how corporations should be governed and financed – 
to be adjudicated exclusively by market processes.  
How else these questions should be adjudicated, however, has not been settled. 
Indeed, debate has become nearly immobilized. There is a pervasive sense that the 
range of possibilities for reform is defined by the following opposition: Either out-
comes in these core areas will be negotiated out among the traditional social stake-
holders (social cooperation) – OR – they will be determined by arms length price tak-
ing market relations. The former is considered to be politically desirable and just (and 
traditionally German), but overly rigid and increasingly unworkable. The latter is 
viewed as workable but unjust and undesirable. The national stalemate is indicative of 
the absence of any practical conceptual way to move forward in the face of what many 
regard as an inescapable zero-sum opposition. 
Paralysis at the national level has not meant, however, that there is no change oc-
curring in Germany. Far from it. At the level of firms and regions, as well as within 
specific functional institutional realms, such as in industrial relations, there has been 
very remarkable change. Interestingly, the same opposition between stakeholder nego-
tiation and market principles also structures the way that these changes have been 
understood. Commentators, on both the left and the right, have claimed that much of 
the local level change has been the result of “liberalization”; i.e., the embrace at the 
local level of precisely the kind of market principles that the Germans reject at the 
national level (e.g., Streeck 2005; Lane 2000; Keller 2006). As at the national level, the 
consensus is that the old institutional system of social coordination is too rigid to be 
able to foster competitiveness in the current competitive environment. Markets are 
coded, even by those who object to their social and political consequences, as the 
vehicles of contemporary flexibility. They make it possible for firms and social actors 
to rapidly and capaciously reallocate resources and even embrace new roles. Thus, 
nearly all local efforts in the workplace, in firms and in associations to achieve flexibil-
ity, define new roles and move away from the traditional rules of social cooperation 
have been characterized as “movements toward the market”, if not the outright em-
brace of market mechanisms.  
Understandably, this interpretation of events at the local level has been tinged 
with considerable pessimism, especially on the left, as it suggests that despite national 
level resistance to the pressures of neo-liberalism, the local institutional foundations of 
social cooperation are increasingly being undermined (Hassel 1999, 2006; Artus 2001; 
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Streeck 2005; Artus et al. 2006). Indeed, on this view, processes of negotiation be-
tween traditional associational stakeholders in the economy, where they are thought to 
still exist, are regarded as special cases. Either they are understood as reactionary rem-
nants (heroic holdouts) of an outdated old system, increasingly hollowed out and 
“eroding” from acid of market process (Hassel 1999; 2006). Or they are viewed as the 
expression of special conditions, having to do with technological or idiosyncratic po-
litical factors, that insulate processes of negotiation from direct contact with market 
competition (Artus et al. 2006). On either variant of this view, continued stakeholder 
governance will last only as long as political will, or technological caprice allows. There 
is, apparently, no positive dynamic contained within the economy that allows for the 
successful regeneration of stakeholder governance and social cooperation in Germany.  
The aim of this essay is to reframe the current process of adjustment in Germany 
in a way that rejects the above opposition between an older entrenched tradition of 
stakeholder cooperation and an insurgent challenge of society transforming market 
liberalization. In the first instance, it would be possible to make this kind of argument 
simply by pointing out that the current opposition between negotiation and markets in 
the debate is overdrawn. It has always been the case that markets have permeated 
German society, so it is unclear why the two forms of practice must be understood as 
antithetical today (see Abelshauser 2003). Although I agree with that claim, I will make 
a different argument against the notion that there is an opposition between coopera-
tion and liberalization. In my view, it is not at all clear that “liberalization” is actually 
the challenge currently being posed to the Germans (or to Europeans more generally). 
There is undeniably pressure to become more flexible in many areas of work and or-
ganizational life in the political economy. It is therefore accurate to say that traditional 
forms of social cooperation in German society are undergoing sometimes very radical 
recomposition. But rather than the embrace of “the market”, these pressures have 
induced widespread experimentation with alternative forms of workplace and firm 
governance that involve continual and collaborative recomposition of stakeholder 
roles in and among firms and social actors. In other words, stakeholder governance is 
not disintegrating in Germany. It is being redefined. 
The current debate overlooks the significance of this process of stakeholder re-
definition because it reifies markets and social cooperation. They are made into mutu-
ally exclusive categories with rigid internal characteristics. At worst, this leaves us with 
projections of clumsy and unrealistic alternatives of path dependent rigidity (social 
cooperation digging in its heels) or past-erasing transformation (atomized marketiza-
tion working like acid in social life) noted above. At best, the reified oppositions allow 
for the construction of so-called “hybrid” arrangements in which the opposing princi-
ples are “combined” through the dilution of cooperative rigidities with market flexibil-
ity (Lane 2000; Casper 2000). But dilution or weakening of cooperative arrangements 
by the introduction of principles of competitive exchange is quite different than the 
redefinition of what social cooperation actually involves. Hybridity (at least in that 
debate) implies demotion, while a focus on redefinition allows for the possibility that 
the practice can actually be enhanced, made stronger and made better. The range of 
possibilities in political and economic practice is greater than the contemporary debate 
is able to recognize. 
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The analysis here will create a space for thinking about a broader range of 
alternative modes of stakeholder governance by making creative actors and the 
dynamic interaction of roles and rules the center of analysis. Here both markets and 
stakeholder arrangements will be understood not as antipodal mechanisms, but rather 
as different groupings of rules (institutions) that specific groupings of reflexive actors 
create to govern particular dimensions of their social process in the economy. Such 
complexes of rules are highly contingent constructs and are recurrently recomposed. 
Actors, enacting roles that the rules are designed to govern, continually reflect upon 
and evaluate the adequacy of both their roles and of the governing rules as they strug-
gle to cope with the challenges and opportunities of their situation. Old roles are 
modified, new roles emerge and rules that prove to be inadequate or irrelevant to the 
emerging situation are either changed or ignored. Those that continue to be effective 
continue to be embraced – though often in unexpected ways.1 Such differentiated 
processes of role and rule evaluation and adjustment involve considerable creativity on 
the part of actors. All solutions are effectively provisional – pragmatists describe them 
as experiments – and actors embrace them only when they help solve the problems 
that have been collectively identified (Joas 1996; Sabel 2005)
Seen in this constructed, un-reified way, markets and social cooperation are by no 
means always in conflict or mutually exclusive. In many cases, rules developed in one 
area can be embraced for ends held by actors committed to the other, and vice a 
versa. This is not the creation of hybrids. It is simply the adaptation of rules for prac-
tical problem solving. The difference in perspectives can perhaps be illustrated by the 
following example. Many of the new experiments in coordination to be described 
below aim for the creation of alternative sets of governance structures in which trans-
parency rules traditionally associated with markets – such as the formalization of 
monitoring procedures and of accounting functions to create greater transparency 
both within and across the borders of organizations – play central roles in the facilita-
tion of new forms of stakeholder collaboration. If one views markets and social col-
laboration as antithetical modes of governance, then this appears to be the embrace of 
market mechanisms. But if one views social collaboration and market practice simply 
as practical (recomposeable) groupings of rules and roles, then the example illustrates 
the selective deconstruction of market principles in the interest of constructing an 
alternative (more effective) set of rules for the governance of collaborative practices 
(Günther/Gonschorek 2006; Sabel 2005; Herrigel 2008).  
The range of this sort of experimentation with rules and roles in Germany today 
is extremely broad – markets, organizations, stakeholders and forms of social and 
political negotiation are all in play, and often in quite unfamiliar and counter-intuitive 
ways. To the extent that it still matters, the old institutional order in the German po-
litical economy increasingly is being filled with distinctly untraditional forms of prac-
tice. But it is also true that in many cases, the old institutions are a side-show to new 
forms of practice, many of which draw selectively on the old institutional mechanisms, 
but deploy them in new ways, quite independently of their place in the old system, 
                                                          
1  In this sense, my position –in contrast to much of institutional analysis--can account for 
both stability and change in relational environments. 
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according to different rules. We will see below that in this context, stakeholderism is 
neither paralyzed nor outmoded in Germany. It is being redefined. 
The argument begins, in section one, with a description of the way in which the 
relational dynamics in industrial markets have been changing. Those changes have 
created great ambiguity in the roles that actors play in production and in the geo-
graphic scale at which production takes place. This, in turn, has given rise to new 
pressures, problems and governance dilemmas that the existing array of institutions 
within the German business system was not designed to address. Section two will then 
show how these pressures are giving rise to new kinds of actors that are redefining 
traditional roles in the political economy and engaging in institutional innovation at a 
very local level. A core claim in this section is that these innovative, emergent actors 
are engaged in open experiments with the institutional rules that are supposed to gov-
ern their relations. Some of these experiments involve creative interpretation of the 
existing rules, others involve the assertion of exceptions, while in other cases there is 
mutual agreement among the parties to place the existing rules aside. The German 
industrial relations system will be used as the primary empirical illustration of these 
dynamics. The argument concludes (section three) with reflections on the possible 
national-level implications of this on-going experimentation at the local level in the 
economy.
1. Current adjustment ressures in the manufacturing economy 
Vertical disintegration is the central dynamic in many industrial markets today. This is 
particularly true of the traditional manufacturing industries that form the core German 
economy (automobiles, machinery, electrical equipment etc). Manufacturing firms are 
to a large extent breaking their production operations up, focusing their own activities 
on the most profitable and most innovative dimensions of their business and shifting 
both development and production of other operations on to suppliers. This process 
has had two seemingly contradictory, but nonetheless intense and unremitting drivers: 
1.) a continuous pressure to innovate, improve technology and production organiza-
tion, and bring out new products more quickly ; and 2.) an equally as unrelenting pres-
sure to reduce production costs.  
The former pressure stems from intense global competition among producers 
and is driven by the shortening of product life cycles and the desire of competing 
firms to identify, exploit and redefine dynamic and plastic consumer tastes. The pres-
sure for cost reduction, in part, grows out of the intensifying pressure for innovation, 
as the development of new technology is expensive and places strains on firm re-
sources. In order to learn about and develop new technologies and applications for 
their products, firms must divert resources from routine production activities into 
research and development areas. Internal departments are benchmarked against out-
side specialists, and if they cannot produce with the same quality and at as low a cost, 
then the operations are shifted outside and the savings directed toward innovation. 
Suppliers are also benchmarked against other suppliers, always on the basis of quality 
and cost, and the winner is always the one with the net lowest costs. In this way, pres-
sures for innovation and cost reduction structure the entire, increasingly disintegrated, 
supply chain. 
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This dynamic of vertical disintegration has affected the character of relations 
within and between firms in the supply chain in two very distinctive ways. The first is 
the emergence of ineradicable role ambiguity. Because the value chain has been disin-
tegrated, customer and supplier relations dominate contemporary manufacturing. But 
the character of relations between customers and suppliers, in particular the specific 
role that the customer and supplier will play in their relation, is always ex ante highly 
uncertain. This is true for three reasons.  
First, larger customers look to suppliers for innovation in areas that the customer 
firm no longer specializes in and suppliers look to customers as sophisticated users of 
their technologies who will push them, even help them, to devise new applications for 
their products. In other words, both customer and supplier look to one another for 
innovation and for learning. Second, because both customer and supplier are under 
constant pressure to innovate, both have an incentive to limit the extent to which 
bilateral relations with particular customers/suppliers become exclusive. Exclusivity 
can lead to myopia and an inability to recognize emerging possibilities in the broader 
field. As a result, even firms benefiting from intimate collaborative, mutual learning 
exchanges, seek to limit those relations in order to be able to scan their relevant tech-
nological landscapes for customers or suppliers with whom they can learn something 
new. In this way, one can think of collaboration as having a cost that both suppliers 
and customers need to minimize. Third, both the customer and supplier are under 
extreme cost reduction pressures, so the customer would like to pay as little for the 
supplier’s product as possible, while the supplier would like to earn as much from the 
relationship as possible. Both will seek to exploit weaknesses in the other’s position in 
the interest of cost reduction and margin protection (Herrigel/Wittke 2005; Herrigel 
2008; Whitford/Zeitlin 2004; Sabel 2005). 
These three logics enter into the constitution of every relationship in the supply 
chain. As a result, up front, it is never clear to either party precisely what kind of rela-
tionship the two are entering into. Neither knows for certain the role they will ulti-
mately play: Will it be a collaborative relationship in which mutual learning is para-
mount? Will it be an arms length relationship in which cost reduction and margin 
protection is the primary game? There are many possibilities for how relationships can 
be established. And then, significantly, once established at a single point in time, those 
relations can then change over time. Past roles are not determining factors for the role 
one will play in the future. Often a supplier will enjoy and benefit from a collaborative 
tie with a customer and yet decide to devote its resources to establishing a substantial 
collaborative relation with one of the customer’s competitors because that competitor 
has know-how that the supplier would like to have access to. Rather than simply 
abandon the old customer, the supplier can decide, for the sake of the relationship in 
the future, to provide the customer with some production capacity at cost so that the 
customer can achieve desired cost reduction targets. Alternatively, a customer and 
supplier may enter into what both hope will be a collaborative relation, but then after 
a short time discover that either the supplier or the customer will not be able to de-
liver their end of the bargain within specified cost parameters. When the supplier is 
the disappointer in such cases, the customer will take jointly developed plans and seek 
bids on them from competitors of the supplier that developed them. Indeed, the sup-
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plier could even find itself bidding on its own designs! Customers and supplier at any 
point can be collaborators in design and production, arms length producers, develop-
ers without production, producers without design – and all and none of the above. 
Elsewhere we have described these dynamics as Sustained Contingent Collaboration 
(Herrigel/Wittke 2005; Wittke 2007; Herrigel 2008). 
The point is that relations are extremely dynamic and heterogeneous in contem-
porary manufacturing, both within firms and between firms. The role of customers 
and suppliers in any given bidding round are fundamentally ambiguous, even to them-
selves. The division of roles only becomes clear through repeated interaction and re-
ciprocal efforts to define the possibilities and limits of a jointly defined project. And 
even then, it is merely provisional, stable and clear only until the end of the project 
and the beginning of another bargaining round.  
Role ambiguity versus institutional frameworks presupposing unambiguous 
roles
Role ambiguity is currently constitutive of industrial practice across the world’s indus-
trial economies. Continuous pressure for innovation and cost reduction is the driver 
of this ambiguity and a vertically disintegrated supply and value chain with highly vola-
tile and heterogeneous relations are its manifestation. The emergence of these kinds of 
relations in industry has generated tremendous pressure for change on all the institu-
tions that constitute national business systems – in industrial relations, vocational 
training, finance, welfare provision, regional industrial policy. By and large, most of 
those institutions, rules for governing relations in industry, were created under condi-
tions that differ significantly from the ones currently shaping play. Above all, nearly all 
of those institutions presuppose the existence of relatively unambiguous, not to say 
fixed, roles among industrial players. As a result, they tend to be oriented toward the 
protection of rights and positions, rather than to their continual redefinition and re-
composition (Kristensen/Rocha 2006). At best, these old institutional arrangements 
can only partially and often only accidentally address the kinds of problems that actors 
in industries characterized by sustained contingent collaboration encounter and gener-
ate. At worst, those institutions constitute barriers to solutions to those problems 
Unsurprisingly, actors on the ground have been energetically engaged in efforts 
to provide solutions for – develop rules for behavior around – the kinds of prob-
lems contemporary industrial practice generates. As I will show below, in Germany 
these efforts have neither involved the wholesale abandonment of the existing co-
operative institutions nor the aggressive embrace of something like unfettered mar-
ket mechanisms. Rather, the current efforts to find reasonable governance structures 
for the problems generated by role ambiguity all involve experimentation around 
and with the existing systems of institutional rules governing cooperation. As the 
character of social cooperation on the ground changes, institutions are being re-
composed and reinvented to support it. In this process, old institutional actors are 
adopting new roles and redefining rules at the same time that new roles and new 
rules are being created. This is not a process of liberalization. Indeed, far from being 
a victim, cast aside by the process of change, stakeholderism is quite central to it. 
But the kind of stakeholderism that is currently emerging is very different than the 
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traditional understanding of corporatist governance that has long defined the German 
political economy.  
2. How is this experimentation taking place? 
The main mechanism driving transformation in the institutional framework of the 
German political economy today is rule breaking – or, at least, experimentation with 
and around existing rules in ways that do not always involve following the rules. Rules 
can be “broken” in a variety of ways – many of these ways are not in and of them-
selves necessarily threatening to the existing system of rules. Some may even be useful 
for the preservation of the existing rules – secondary or informal sectors in economies 
often emerge due to rigidities in core sector practices, for example. Other kinds of 
actions are simply exceptions to the rules, as when one has to break one rule in order 
to comply with another. There also can be important new action that occurs in areas 
where the existing set of rules simply do not apply. Finally, since rule following itself is 
a repetitive activity that involves constant interpretation and reinterpretation as one 
attempts to apply the general prescriptions of a rule to the peculiar and particular facts 
of a case, actors constantly change rules (or redefine them) even as they follow them.2
All of these forms of normal “rule breaking” can be found in abundance in Ger-
many today. But in crucial cases that I will outline, it is also true that rules are simply 
not being applied in areas in which they are intended to govern or they are self con-
sciously being applied in ways that undermine the end to which they were originally 
devised. Call this rule breaking by mutual consent or coordination to act in ways that 
are not proscribed or intended by the existing rules. The crucial occasion for all of the 
examples of experimentation around rules that I will describe is that the traditional 
rules, and the proscribed roles for actors within those rules, no longer address the 
dynamics and governance problems that actors in industry confront.  
Below I will provide examples of experimentation with rules and roles in the 
areas of industrial relations. The reason for this is that examples of experimentation 
with rules and roles are especially clear in this area. Moreover, the industrial relations 
system in Germany has received a great deal of international attention and its changes 
have elicited much debate about the compatibility of “coordinated capitalism” in the 
labor market with increasing liberalization. My view that change in Germany is not 
rightly understood as a process of liberalization, but rather as one in which principles 
of markets and social cooperation are just so many rules for the governance of roles 
and in particular in which stakeholder coordination is being redefined is illustrated 
very well by the industrial relations case.  
2.1 Industrial relations literature and contemporary change in industrial relations 
There is much hand-wringing in the literature on the current state of the German 
system of industrial relations.3 Most analyses, even when there are disagreements on 
                                                          
2  In thinking about the plasticity of rules, I have found the following to be very helpful 
Edgerton (1985), Ortmann (2003), Miller (1956), Lewis (1988), Mayo (1954), Melberg 
(1990), Taylor (1995), and Bourdieu (1977). 
3  for a good summary of the debate, see Grahl/Teague (2004). 
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the long term implications, agree that the traditional dual system of industrial relations, 
in which trade unions negotiate industry wide collective agreements with organized 
employers that are then subsequently implemented within individual firms through 
negotiation between works councils and plant management, has been destabilized. 
Most importantly, the crucial informal solidarity linking industrial unions with plant 
level works councils has been broken4. As firms and plants seek to cope with the con-
stant turbulence generated by the ambiguity of roles in the value chain, they seek 
greater local flexibility and chafe at the restrictions placed on their ability to organize 
work time and wage payment placed on them by industry wide collective agreements. 
Alliances for adjustment and employment between plant management and works 
councils have proliferated that systematically implement arrangements locally that 
depart from the industry wide benchmarks established by the unions and organized 
employers (Rehder 2003; Seifert/Massa-Wirth 2005; Williams/Geppert 2006).
This kind of Verbetrieblichung (segmentation/atomization) in the industrial 
relations system has been further exacerbated by the proliferation of so-called variable 
pay regimes in which workers are paid individually for their performance rather than 
according to more general hourly metrics calculated on the basis of fixed positions in 
the division of labor (Kurdelbusch 2002). Finally, and most distressingly, there has 
been a growing exodous of employers out of employers associations and hence a 
growing population of firms and workers that do not directly participate in the con-
struction of industry wide wage agreements at all – although they often remain ori-
ented toward broad industry agreements (Artus 2006). Small and medium sized sup-
plier firms, as well as many firms of all types in eastern Germany and also many so-
called “new economy” firms in emergent high technology sectors find participation in 
the traditional industrial relations system to be disadvantageous, overly costly and in 
many cases irrelevant to the pressures they face in their competitive markets (Artus 
2001; Artus et al. 2006).
The literature describing these developments has two clear preoccupations. First, 
most analyses are primarily concerned with whether or not the above developments 
constitute “liberalization”. Evidence is mixed for arguments both for and against. For 
example, while the segmentation and atomization of bargaining has been interpreted 
as a kind of liberalization of the system, the segmenting and atomizing has been nego-
tiated out by unions and employers associations (largely through the innovation of 
“opening clauses” in industry wide contracts that allow for local level deviations, so 
long as they are necessary for the survival of the firm). Moreover, the individual bar-
gaining units that engage in deviations are themselves governed very intensely by 
stakeholder principles and the local deviations are all negotiated out between man-
agement and works councils. The force and authority of industry wide agreements 
have undoubtedly been weakened, but if that is “liberalization”, it is still highly medi-
ated by social cooperation. Second, the literature focuses on forms of institutional 
change that do not involve either rule breaking or even experimentation. Instead, the 
                                                          
4  See Thelen (1991) for a lucid description of the way in which the informal tie between 
plant based works councils and union based wage bargaining used to work. Artus (2001) 
offers an excellent discussion of the breakdown of this tie in the 1990s. 
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focus is on forms of practice that result from very explicit decisions on the part of 
negotiating parties to create new rules that allow for new forms of practice within the 
framework of the old system. One of the strongest overviews of these sets of changes 
describes the current situation as “change within continuity” (Streeck/Rehder 2003). 
While there is much value in this framing of the situation, in my view its weak-
ness is that the preoccupation with the spectre of liberalization turns the eye away 
from widespread experimentation within the industrial relations system with the char-
acter of social cooperation and stakeholderism itself. Moreover, attention to develop-
ments that result from formal and explicit rule changes results in the neglect of wide-
spread experimentation with rules and roles.
In the next section, I will show that this is particularly true of developments on 
the firm and inter-firm side of the dual system, though I will also present some inter-
esting experiments on the union/employer association side of the now destabilized 
system. In my view, the break down of the informal tie between associational collec-
tive bargainers and firm based stakeholders has given rise to very uneven processes of 
role and rule experimentation in the German industrial relations system. The associa-
tions appear to be more conservative than actors within the firms. In this section, I 
will describe a range of experiments with roles and rules currently being undertaken 
within and between German firms that recast the nature of stakeholder governance. 
In the subsequent section, I will speculate on potential consequences of these devel-
opments for the system of industrial relations as a whole.  
2.2 Experimentation in contemporary German industrial relations5
There are several examples of experimentation with rules and roles involving Volks-
wagen, the VW works council and the IG Metall. The first shows actors creatively 
adapting rules to be able to engage in roles that are explicitly prevented by other rules. 
In collaboration with the City of Wolfsburg, and with the consent of IG Metall, 
Volkswagen has arranged for the construction of a research and development facility 
that allows the company to do something that German law technically prevents: i.e., to 
incorporate its suppliers into its development and production processes in a way that 
facilitates the iterated and role defining process of design refinement and production 
organization, known in the industry as “simultaneous engineering”. In German law, it 
is illegal to have suppliers working on a customer’s product in plants or facilities that 
are owned by a customer. This is a law that was designed to prevent companies from 
hiring workers on short term contracts under different terms than those specified in 
the local collective bargaining agreement covering the rest of the workforce at the 
                                                          
5  For the most part, the empirical material for the following section is drawn from over 100 
qualitative interviews that Volker Wittke and I have conducted in German automobile, 
electrical mechanical and mechanical engineering supply chains since 2001. Interviews 
took place in both customer and supplier firms, of all sizes, in all manufacturing regions 
of the Federal Republic. Managers, works councilors and members of associations (uni-
ons and employer associations) were systematically included among the interview part-
ners. Interviews lasted anywhere from one to six hours, were recorded and were conduc-
ted with an assurance of confidentiality. Information on the joint research project is avail-
able at www.globalcomponents.org (see also Herrigel 2008).  
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company (Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz). The existence of this law, a big victory for the 
union movement and the social democratic party back in the day, has often been an 
obstacle for German firms in their efforts generally to adopt the collaborative and 
decentralized principles in the Japanese or Toyota production system, including simul-
taneous engineering. In other words, it is a barrier to the integration of suppliers as 
stakeholders in production. 
To get around the fact that it was illegal for VW to engage in simultaneous engi-
neering on its own premises, the company persuaded the city government of Wolfs-
burg to agree to form a joint stock company, Wolfsburg AG. 6 The city and company 
shared ownership in the company equally. This independent company was then made 
the legal owner of production and design facilities in which VW (and its suppliers) 
then proceeded to, as legal tenants, engage in simultaneous engineering. Here the 
market is being used to facilitate collaboration and rules are being used to conflate 
rules as actors redefine their roles in production. The next step (not yet taken) is to 
allow VW employees and supplier employees to jointly assemble cars on Wolfsburg 
AG owned assembly lines. As auto suppliers come from a variety of industries, go-
verned by a variety of collective agreements with different unions (and in some cases 
by no collective agreement) this could potentially create the possibility for one 
assembly line in one plant to be governed by several collective agreements – a very un-
German prospect. Yet it is one that creative actors in the supply chain are pursuing in 
order to be able to construct organizational practices that allow them to cope with the 
dual pressures of innovation and cost reduction. 
Another VW example is a case where the stakeholders involved (VW, the Em-
ployers Association in Lower Saxony, the IG Metall and the VW All Corporate Works 
Council), with the consent of the regional government, agreed to place all the existing 
rules of collective bargaining at VW aside, and construct an entirely new car model in 
a separate VW owned facility next to the main assembly complex in Wolfsburg. 
Known as the Auto 5000 experiment, the project built a new mini van model using a 
workforce composed entirely of formerly unemployed workers in lower Saxony. The 
new workers were paid wages set at the regionally bargained minimum rate, rather 
than the much higher rate that the traditional “Haus” collective agreement between 
IG Metall and VW traditionally established. In addition, VW and IG Metall agreed to 
experiment with new forms of work organization, in particular multi-functional team 
organization in which teams were responsible for their own costs and in which work-
ers were rewarded for both product improvement and cost reduction suggestions. The 
latter were practices that VW had awkwardly and haltingly introduced in other Ger-
man factories – though they were more common in VW facilities outside of Germany. 
The rationale for this mutually agreed project of rule breaking is that the existing sys-
tem of rules, and the roles in production that they organize, were both too expensive 
and too rigid to allow for the continuous redefinition of roles that the twin pressures 
of constant innovation and systematic cost reduction encourage. In order to be able to 
achieve both goals simultaneously one needed to have the alternative, cross-functional 
                                                          
6  For a description of Wolfsburg AG, see: http://www.wolfsburg-ag.com/sixcms/  
detail.php?template=wob_master&lang=de&sv[id]=25584&nav1=25585 
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and self-optimizing structures that the Auto 5000 project experimented with (Schu-
mann, et al 2006).7
More broadly in the German manufacturing economy, works councils constitute 
a broad area of experimentation with both roles and rules. Our interviews revealed 
countless efforts to transform them from specialists for work place scheduling, train-
ing, job retention and the processing of grievances, to “co-managing” units participat-
ing with other functional departments within the firm in interrelated discussions on 
product design, process optimization and cost in the plant.8 This represents an expan-
sion/redefinition of the role given to works councils in the Works Constitution Act. 
In the new role, works councils continue to be responsible for the activities that are 
defined for them in the Works Constitution Act. But now in addition, the works 
council engages as a worker representative in whole firm deliberations about cost 
reduction and innovation. By drawing on their presence in all workshops and depart-
ments in a plant, works councils have the unique capacity to accumulate information 
(if they choose to collect it) about work flow, inventory, work in process, the effi-
ciency of work organization and other dimensions of the production process. Such 
information, particularly as it cuts across the entire plant, is indispensable for the 
achievement of cost reduction – as well as for the identification of possibilities for 
both technical design improvements and organizational innovation. Such activities can 
result in the re-allocation of jobs and assignments as well as the elimination of jobs. 
But it can also ensure that more traditional management departments also engaged in 
the identification of cost reduction possibilities expand their attention beyond making 
savings on labor costs alone (Klitzke et al. 2000; Minssen/Riese 2006). 
It is important to emphasize that such experiments in co-management do not 
simply or even necessarily amount to the self-rationalization of labor.9 In many cases, 
the expanding role of the works council involves systematic expansion of its technical 
and design capabilities – hiring additional staff with engineering know how, upgrading 
the skills of existing works councilors etc. The reason for this has to do with the link-
age between innovation pressure and cost reduction. On the one hand, in order to 
devote resources to innovation, production processes and work flows constantly need 
to be rationalized so that costs are minimized. On the other hand, the optimization of 
production and work flow very often can be achieved through innovation in product 
                                                          
7  Thanks to Michael Schumann and Hans Joachim Sperling for extensive discussions of 
their on going empirical work on the Auto 5000 experiment. 
8  I use the term “co-management” loosely to describe a broad range of efforts on the part 
of works councils to engage in a broader range of managerial activities – in particular the 
identification of possibilities for cost reduction in production and materials flow – that 
involves increasing collaboration between works councils and non-traditionally labor ori-
ented parts of management, such as logistics, product development and financial depart-
ments within the firm. The usage here overlaps with but is not identical to the way in 
which “co-management” is defined in the industrial relations and trade union discussions 
of the term. For the latter see, Klitzke et al. (2000). 
9  For that argument, and the legitimation problems thought to emerge from that role, see 
Rehder (2006). 
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design. Because progress on both ends is always desirable and often inter-related, it 
makes little sense for participants in the process to be specialized in only one aspect. 
At one Wuppertal based bearing manufacturing facility, for example, this has 
prompted the works council to draw additional technically trained employees into its 
staff. The works council works actively to develop innovative product design ideas 
that can be achieved within desirable cost parameters (interview).  
Co-management, at least in the form described, represents an embrace by the 
works council of a qualitatively different stakeholder role in the firm. It is crucial to 
see that its efforts to embrace this role are provoked by the pervasive and constant 
role ambiguity in production that the firm’s efforts to cope with the twin pressures of 
constant innovation and constant cost reduction generate. By simply acting within the 
confines of its traditional role, works councilors recognize that they forfeit a genuine 
opportunity to have stakeholder input in the continuous process of recomposition in 
contemporary production. They need to be involved in the process of recomposition 
in order to be able to influence it. In order to be able to do that, they need to expand 
their capacities and collect and share more information about the production process 
with other “stakeholders” within the firm.  
Traditionally, works councils understood stakeholder representation in a narrowly 
distributive sense (how to maximize employee security and wages relative to the inter-
ests of management and ownership). This understanding presupposed a static divide 
between management and employees and clear and stable roles for each within the 
production process. At bottom, it provided the works councils with a defensive and 
rights defending role in the firm (cf. Kristensen/Rocha 2006). The new works council 
role, at least in the best and most successful cases we have seen in Automobile and 
Machinery industry producers and the suppliers along their supply chains, recasts 
stakeholderism in a way that seeks to maximize the contribution that employees make 
to the firm’s capacity to successfully innovate and reduce costs. It presupposes – in-
deed it helps to create – a fluid and continuously self-recomposing distribution of 
roles within production. In this sense it is pro-active and rights creating. What this 
new works council role shares with the old role, interestingly, is the sense that stake-
holders have power within the organization. That power is enacted differently – ar-
guably with a more extensive impact on the ongoing organization of design and 
manufacturing with the firm – but the insistence on mutual recognition among stake-
holding-parties is the same. 
Crucially, works councils, and firms with works councils, are not the only actors 
in Germany currently experimenting with ways in which traditional modes of coop-
erative stakeholderism can be redefined. There are many examples of firms that are 
legally entitled to form works councils, but yet exercise their right not to adopt one. 
They exercise a rule that allows them to leave the rules in abeyance. And the range 
of outcomes in these areas is very interesting. It is not all simple management 
domination (though there is some of that).10 There are many examples of worker-
                                                          
10  For a useful typology of governance types in firms without works councils, which in-
cludes both mutual cooperation between management and alternatively organized em-
ployees and asymmetrical relations of managerial exploitation, see Böhm/Lücking (2006). 
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management coordination on matters relevant to the competitiveness of the firm, in 
particular regarding reconciling the twin pressures of constant innovation and con-
stant cost reduction. In these cases, employees view the workplace representation 
organizations made available to them by law to be inadequate to the collective tasks of 
innovation and cost reduction that they are confronted with. In the previous example, 
already existing works councils entered upon new terrain and redefined their role in 
order to be able to participate in cross functional plant wide organizations designed to 
address issues of innovation and cost reduction. In these latter instances, participatory 
cross functional and cross plant organizations are created that facilitate simultaneous 
and constant monitoring of costs and search for possible innovative improvements in 
the technology and production process. In such cases, employees do not bother to set 
up the traditional, and to them apparently unnecessary (irrelevant?) works council 
structures. They are relevantly involved in the governance of the firm in an alternative 
way.
Indeed, in many Betriebe ohne Betriebsräte (Artus et al. 2006) in what are provoca-
tively called the “Co-determination Free Zones” of the economy, the ability of em-
ployees to participate in in-plant monitoring organizations at various levels that in-
volve multiple departments is at least as great as it is in co-determined plants with 
formal works councils. In the codetermined arenas, works councils have extra burdens 
that codetermination free plants do not have: Works councils must struggle to rede-
fine their roles and gain management and cross departmental acknowledgement and 
participation in the monitoring of cost reduction possibilities, where as such structures 
in the codetermination free plants are created for that purpose. It’s the difference 
between having an actor with a traditional role acquire new roles versus the creation 
of new actors with new roles.  
Critics point to the fact that, unlike the formal works councils, the new codeter-
mination free organizations are not explicitly devoted to work place democracy and 
the representation of worker interests against those of owners (e.g. Böhm/Lücking 
2006; Keller 2006). The new representation structures do not have the same continu-
ity that works councils have, in that they tend to be project oriented. The structures of 
representation and the actors involved in self-representation change and recompose 
with the change and recomposition of the roles of the firm. The divide between work-
ers and owners is obscured in the new structures, as no side of the ledger reliably con-
tributes more to cost reduction or innovation than the other. Indeed, both are becom-
ing aware of their increasing mutual dependence. Critics worry that continuous re-
composition of participatory arrangements could produce atomization, making indi-
viduals vulnerable while at the same time reducing solidarity among stakeholders. But 
there is just as much reason to believe that the more recomposition is successful, the 
more it will create an organization wide feeling of mutual dependence and hence of an 
intensified sense of the legitimacy of stakeholder entitlement.  
This is not to say that there are no difficulties in the new style organizations. Self 
exploitation (working long hours, not taking vacations etc) is a dimension of such 
team organizations. The possibility exists that people get caught up in the challenge of 
their collective work projects and extend themselves in illegal and unhealthy ways; 
worse, co-workers can be intimidated into not taking what is their due because of fear 
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of group reprisal. There are also questions, especially in small family or single owner 
entrepreneurial enterprises of arbitrary authority in the last instance by owners. In 
such cases, collaboration and recomposition occurs at the discretion of the owner and 
is limited by her authority. These are very difficult questions and there are many ex-
amples of good and bad process to deal with them. But the key point is that such 
questions are just as relevant to works councilors engaging in a new co-management 
role as there are for those actors simply engaging in the new role. Works councils, in 
their new role, can enthusiastically participate in a culture of self-exploitation, and they 
can also decide not to invoke their right to challenge entrepreneurial authority in an 
area that has not traditionally been considered to be within their baliwick. These are 
governance and accountability questions concerning a role that is outside the current 
system of workplace governance. Works councils find themselves upon uncharted 
terrain in the same way that codetermination free self-governing project teams do.11
In any case, the nostalgic political yearnings of critics for a world of clear bounda-
ries and relatively fixed roles among stakeholders seems to have little currency among 
participants in the new style arrangements in firms that for one reason or another 
have no existing tradition of works council representation. Instead of choosing to 
adopt an institution, only then to have to redefine what it does in a way that is consis-
tent with contemporary demands, workers in firms without works councils seem to be 
deciding simply to construct participatory arrangements that reflect their own, con-
stantly changing and self – recomposing work experience.  
What ever the reason, the facts are that the majority of firms in the eastern part 
of Germany, increasing numbers of suppliers in manufacturing supply chains, as well 
as most new start-ups in newer areas of the industrial economy, as in software, bio-
tech and other “new economy” sectors have decided to exercise their legal right NOT 
to form a works council. Numbers without works councils are significantly greater in 
those areas, sectors and firms where the tradition of codetermination is weak or has 
been dislodged (Ellguth 2006). 
Another kind of remarkable role transformation – and unlike all the previous ex-
amples, a case of rule and role experimentation on the extra-firm, union/employer 
association side of the German dual system-- is taking place in Wuppertal. There the 
local IG Metall office is redefining its role to act as a kind of regional restructuring 
agency. In this case, as in the case of co-managing works councils, the union adds a 
new role to its traditional role within the rules of the existing system of industrial rela-
tions. It bargains with the local employers association and it monitors firms to ensure 
that they are abiding by the terms of existing collective agreements. Yet, in addition, 
the union embraces a new role. It is being called into firms, often by the management 
                                                          
11  Interestingly, the Dresden group’s survey of the degree to which small and medium sized 
firms have adopted “value accounting” techniques – which facilitate intra-firm informati-
on exchange among collaborating stakeholders-- shows that the (nearly pervasive adopti-
on) is not regarded by the adopting owners and top managers to be in tension with their 
“social” commitments to stakeholders within the firm. The majority of adopters have re-
tained the strong social commitments that they held prior to the adoption (Günther/ 
Gonschorek 2006). 
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of the firm itself, to help with internal restructuring and with the reformulation of 
product and market strategies. There are no rules that govern the latter form of activ-
ity. But increasingly, such activities dominate the activities of the Wuppertal office – 
so much so that the office complains that it would actually be advantageous for the 
union if the employers association became involved in the restructuring activities – a 
partner in crime, so to speak. (interview)  
To be clear, Wuppertal is not actually a case of rule breaking. There are no rules 
that apply to the activities of trade unions as restructuring consultants. But in a con-
crete sense, the fact that it has adopted a role as restructuring consultant has given it 
the legitimacy to press works councils to embrace the new roles (co-management) 
described above. Not only that, the Union teaches works councils how to participate 
in the construction of new forms of work organization that enhance the firm’s capac-
ity to engage in continuous cost reduction and innovation scanning.12 Successful cases, 
such as the Wuppertal bearing manufacturer mentioned above, help to draw other 
works councils into the embrace of new roles and rules that they previously had not 
been willing or trusting enough to consider. At the same time, the union can push 
employers to accept the new role for works councils and in general to turn their eyes 
in the direction of organizational change that aims at whole organizational analyses of 
cost reduction, rather than simply focusing on the contribution of labor to costs. In 
this sense, the embrace of a new role for the trade union has induced players within 
firms to give up their attachments to the formal and informal rules and practices that 
had traditionally governed production and engage in practices that constitute new 
roles for both stakeholders. 
3. What to make of these examples:  
The recomposition of stakeholderism in German manufacturing? 
These are all experiments around rules and roles. They sometimes involve rule break-
ing, other times they are simply examples of cases in which the rules do not apply (and 
where no one suggests that they should). In other cases, they are expressions of very 
creative use of existing rules. In many cases, actions seem to be motivated or bound 
up with the existence of role ambiguity and they involve the creation of new roles. 
Finally, all of the above industrial relations cases are examples of local experiments 
that allow employees and managers in firms to cope with the twin pressures of inno-
vation and cost reduction. None are “macro” experiments. Indeed, for the most part 
they are taking place underneath national level institutions that are changing much less 
radically, if at all.  
The examples I have presented are also selective in that they address the central 
dilemma in industry today: How to cope with the twin pressures of innovation and 
cost reduction under conditions of continuously recurring role ambiguity. To be sure, 
there are other kinds of experiments in the contemporary German system of industrial 
relations. For example, there are efforts on the part of management to eliminate em-
ployee participation entirely and re-impose a kind of Taylorist control over the work-
                                                          
12  Monitoring work in progress, reduction of inventory, cellular organization, cross func-
tional exchanges – etc. 
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place. Here the idea is to achieve constant cost reduction through the radical separa-
tion of employees from the innovation process within the firm (Springer 1999). There 
are also (still) examples of the old system in place, where skilled labor, traditional 
works councils and management, all with very clear roles, informally collaborate in 
ways that seek to improve the quality of the firm’s product and achieve a position in 
the market that is insulated from cost competition. The problem with both of these 
kinds of contemporary practice, however, is that, in contrast to the examples above, 
they focus only on one of the twin pressures facing firms, either cost reduction or 
innovation, and do not possess the capacity to continuously achieve both simultane-
ously. It may be that such alternative practices will be able to reproduce themselves in 
the current environment. Yet by seeking to keep the twin pressures of innovation and 
cost reduction separate from one another, they impose limits on the range of possibili-
ties available to solve both. This is not true of the examples presented. 
It is unclear what will happen with any of these examples of experimentation. In 
particular, there is no obvious link between the firm and inter-firm based experiments 
in stakeholder governance and the union and associational side of the dual industrial 
relations system. As such, the implications of the redefinition of stakeholderism 
throughout the German economy for the industrial relations systems as a whole are 
unclear. The examples of rule and role experimentation that I have highlighted, how-
ever, show very clearly that the recomposition of relations and governance structures 
in German manufacturing is by no means reducible to a simple process of marketiza-
tion or liberalization. Social cooperation among stakeholders continues to be a central 
dimension of industrial practice, though in increasingly different and new forms. All 
caveats regarding the lack of obvious linkages between these local level changes and 
macro transformation acknowledged, the examples provided suggest some intriguing 
possibilities for further, even macro level, change. The most dramatic possibilities 
stem from the fact that the process of experimental change by breaking or ignoring 
rules – without formally seeking to change them – is slowly both creating new social 
actors in the economy and transforming the notion of what a stakeholder is and of 
what it means to have stakeholder governance.  
The examples above show that new actors are emerging as substitutes for, com-
petitors of or simply as additions to the traditional role players in the German econ-
omy. Works councils engaging systematically in collaborative cost reduction and ra-
tionalization or local unions that restructure local firms are incidences of traditional 
kinds of actors embracing wholly new roles. Their actions do not so much break the 
existing rules as they ignore them in an effort to solve pressing problems in ways that 
are consistent with larger normative ends that define the actors. In both cases, the end 
in view for the innovative actors is to keep production in the location, and ultimately, 
thereby, to save jobs. The means by which the new stakeholder arrangements seek to 
achieve their ends are in tension with existing rules and also role definitions, but none 
the less they are consistent with some (higher order) understanding of what the ends 
of union and works councils should be. By retaining and invoking principles of stake-
holder legitimacy in governance, but in new roles, these experiments are slowly rede-
fining the stakes that employees hold in firms (and communities). And they are creat-
ing new forms of stakeholder participation in firm and community governance.  
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The new forms are much more collaborative and transgress old adversarial di-
vides between labor and capital and unions and employer associations. Rather than 
attempting to demarcate a realm of distinct employee rights, for example, these or-
ganizations in their new roles attempt to empower those they represent by collaborat-
ing with other stakeholders to make the firm (or community) more successful. The 
irony in this is that in committing themselves to cooperative stakeholderism, the 
groups facilitate the continuous recomposition of roles and relations in the production 
process that results in the continual redefinition and realignment of stakes in the en-
terprise. Who the stakeholders are, in other words, is continuously redefined as rela-
tions within and between firms are recomposed over time. 
The cases of new forms of participation in codetermination free zones represent 
a very different way to arrive at a similar end. Here old actors are not seeking to define 
new roles for themselves. Instead, new stakeholder positions and stakeholder concep-
tions are emerging without (and sometimes against) the old institutions. Rather than a 
labor/capital divide, the new participatory arrangements are (in the best cases) gener-
ating an underlying culture of mutual dependence. In these new arrangements, stake-
holderism, in an alternative form, is indispensable for the ability of the firm to be 
competitive. The more successful the arrangements are at facilitating productive re-
combination, the more indispensable they become. Moreover, since the constitution 
of cross functional projects often involves the participation of actors from both cus-
tomer and supplier firms, new style principles of stakeholderism are diffusing along 
the supply chain and in many cases actually govern the supply chain. 
The interesting thing about these two distinct processes of change is that they 
converge. The old institutions redefining their roles (works councils and local unions) 
increasingly act in ways that are similar to new arrangements that have sometimes 
constituted themselves in explicit opposition to what they took to be old institutional 
practice. Irony aside, the convergence of different institutional actors around the prin-
ciples of collaborative stakeholderism at a local level inescapably poses the question of 
how such arrangements will be treated by existing national level stakeholder institu-
tions (trade unions and employer associations), both of which until now have shown 
little interest in redefining their roles or their conceptions of stakeholder governance. 
National unions and employers associations presuppose a divide between labor and 
capital that presumes a continuity of roles and interest alignments within firms and 
within the society. In this older view, the principle of stakeholderism is tied to the 
reproduction of relatively stable stakeholder role positions and identities. They are 
focused on the protection of rights and entitlements ascribed to role positions in the 
society. How can such a view of stakeholderism cope with the emergent alternative in 
which the link between stakeholder governance and stable role positions has been 
broken?  
This is a question that has really yet to be posed in Germany today, at least not in 
this form. But, without suggesting which is the more likely, plausible or desirable out-
come, it is easy to see that there are at least three possible ways in which the relation-
ship between the old stakeholder institutions can relate to the newly emergent ones.  
First, the national organizations can seek to defend their own conception of 
stakeholderism and block the diffusion of the emergent alternative by using their 
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leverage in resources to punish local experiments and ally with actors at local levels 
that are still committed to the traditional stakeholder conceptions and its institutional 
roles. This, obviously, would do very little to stanch the already significant centrifugal 
pressures that currently plague the dual system and result in stakeholder groupings 
within firms pursuing their own course independent of their corporate representatives. 
Nor would it contribute to the re-establishment of informal cooperation between 
extra firm associations and intra- and inter-firm actors that made the old German 
industrial relations system work so well in the past. Plus, by seeking to undermine the 
construction of collaborative processes within firms that facilitate continuous self 
recomposition, a reactionary move by the associations could have disastrous conse-
quences for the competitiveness of German industry. But by establishing allies within, 
for example, re-Taylorizing firms as well as the handful of insulated producers still 
producing in traditional ways, associational actors hostile to the new forms of stake-
holderism could conceivably create a niche within the institutional landscape of the 
economy in which traditional class based and rigid forms of stakeholderism continued 
to exist. This, arguably, is what is currently happening with the Auto 5000 experiment 
described above. 
A second possibility would be for actors committed to the emergent alternative 
stakeholder governance arrangements to construct an alternative national (or supra-
firm and supra-regional) system that sought to end run around the existing stake-
holder organizations, much in the way the new stakeholder arrangements have 
emerged in the codetermination free zones at the local level. Aside from invariable 
opposition from the existing stakeholder organizations to such efforts, it will be cru-
cial for such an effort to reconcile the alternative stakeholder efforts that involve (re-
defined) works councils and local unions with those alternative efforts that exclude 
and are opposed to those organizations. The latter need to be disabused of their view 
that the traditional institutions are irrelevant, while the former need to be disabused of 
the view that the codetermination free zones are operating according to different, 
unaccountable, principles. Far from far fetched as a scenario, one could easily imagine 
gradual processes of experimentation and organizational redefinition at increasingly 
higher levels of territorial and organizational complexity in response to emergent 
problems and opportunities for stakeholder actors at lower levels.  
For example, a significant problem confronting both new forms of stakeholder-
ism within the process of continuous recomposition in a firm is that all employees 
may not always be needed in every iteration of the recomposition of the production 
process. As a result, new style stakeholders are inhibited in making decisions that re-
sult in dismissal not only because they feel a commitment to providing employment, 
but also because they realize that though not needed in this round, the dismissed em-
ployee’s expertise may be needed in a subsequent round. The inhibiting fear is that 
once let go, a valuable skilled employee is difficult to get back. Firms and new style 
stakeholder groups, therefore, have an interest in creating a system that can govern 
labor circulation among firms in local and regional labor markets.  
In Denmark, such problems have led to the transformation of the vocational 
training system and the way in which both local employers and trade unions are in-
volved in it. Rather than seeking to retain employees within firms, the new extra firm 
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stakeholder system seeks to support and train workers let go in ways that make them 
capable of re-entering the process of re-composition within firms with enhanced skills 
and capacities. By creating institutions outside the firm that supports worker mobility, 
the system actually enhances the capacity of stakeholding actors within firms to crea-
tively tackle the challenges posed by constant pressure for innovation and cost reduc-
tion (Kristensen 2006; Madsen 2005). The argument here is not to advocate the em-
brace of the Danish solution to this problem. The aim is only to point out that there 
are extra-firm problems generated by the new forms of stakeholder practice within 
firms that could be addressed with new forms of stakeholder practice at the extra firm 
level. Bootstrapping experimentation on the part of new style stakeholders could yield 
new style arrangements at higher levels of social and economic governance.  
The third possibility is for the traditional extra firm stakeholder organizations, 
trade unions and employers associations, to change and embrace the alternative con-
ception of stakeholder governance that is emerging through experimentation at the 
local level. Here, national unions and employers associations would identify (or re-
spond to the lower level identification of) public good problems that constituted ob-
stacles for lower level actors in their efforts to make continuous progress with both 
innovation and cost reduction. Even better, the national organizations could take it as 
their charge to continuously monitor lower level arrangements, facilitate benchmark-
ing processes (that are inter-regional and inter-national) and help to diffuse best prac-
tice.
In this way, national level stakeholder organizations would change their role from 
defenders of social divisions to facilitators of lower level social and economic re-
composition in the interest of greater economic success for all. The specific temporal 
identity of social stakeholders would in this way be short lived. Who was who and 
who had what stake would be continuously re-defined. But the principle of stake-
holder governance would be entrenched from top to bottom in the society. Ironically, 
the kind of flexibility and continuous recomposition that in the current debate is 
thought to be the province of liberalization and the diffusion of market processes, 
would in this alternative case become the systematic objective of social cooperation. 
There are limits to how much speculation of the above kind can achieve. Ulti-
mately what emerges will be the outcome of highly contingent political struggles 
among creative and reflexive social actors under conditions that are not always of their 
own making. The aim of this essay has not been to predict the future, but rather to 
characterize the manner in which change is currently taking place. Actors on the 
ground are far less paralyzed by seemingly contradictory oppositions between stake-
holder cooperation and liberalization than one might be led to believe if one focused 
only on the national level debate or on the way that local level change within industrial 
relations has be framed in the scientific literature. New kinds of social actors and new 
conceptions of stakeholding are emerging in Germany. Perhaps if actors at the na-
tional level abandoned the conceptual opposition between social cooperation and 
liberalization, and understood the process of change as one involving a more and less 
continuous process of experimentation with roles and rules, the sense of paralysis 
would lessen and the range of palatable possibilities for reform would seem greater. 
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